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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine how inter-firm partnerships impact long-term operating performance. 
With a global economy, rapid product cycles, capital constraints and advances in technology, 
firms seldom possess all the capabilities necessary to maintain and grow market share. 
Consequently, firms rely on a variety of partnerships. Theory suggests that firms enter such 
relationships to improve performance through access to new products, new markets, or new 
capabilities. Yet, relatively little is known about the long-term impact of collaborative 
arrangements such as alliances and established major customer relationships, although such dual 
partnership arrangements can have a major impact on the firm’s performance success.  Our 
empirical results indicate that inter-firm partnerships affect operating performance, but the 
impact often depends on the industry, the nature of the firm, and the type of partnership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
e investigate the effect of interfirm partnerships on the long-term performance of high-tech firms. 
Seeking competitive advantage, today’s managers often turn to such partnerships. These 
relationships can provide new sources of growth while allowing firms to manage costs, rapid 
product cycles, capital constraints, and advances in technology (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004; Alvarez and 
Barney, 2001). Yet, little is known about the long-term impact of interfirm partnerships on firm performance, and 
evidence indicates many managers are disappointed in partnership results (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004).  
 
Collaborative relationships encompass a variety of organizational forms. Chiesa and Manzini (1998) 
describe a continuum of collaborations specified by integration of activities and resources between firms: 
acquisitions lie at one end, outsourcing at the other, and varying long-term relationships such as joint ventures and 
strategic alliances lie in between. Interfirm partnerships can also be classified as either horizontal or vertical. Both 
augment firm internal resources through collaboration: horizontal partnerships do so with competing or unrelated 
firms and vertical partnerships with either suppliers or customers.  
 
Horizontal partnerships—broadly referred to as alliances—have been studied extensively. Baker et al. 
(2002), define an alliance as any structure to manage an incomplete contract between separate firms, with limited 
individual partner control. Despite a sizeable body of research examining market reactions to alliances (e.g., Koh 
and Venkatraman, 1991; Das et al., 1998), relatively few studies examine their longer-term performance 
consequences. Further, Chan et al. (1997) find no evidence of performance improvement following alliance 
formation and Dyer et al. (2004) note that half of all alliances fail.  
 
Vertical partnerships include supplier relationships with major customers, ranging from routine buyer-
supplier transactions to formal strategic alliances. The opportunity to share information and improve overall supply 
W 
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chain management creates the potential for performance improvements. However, Dwyer et al. (1987) note powerful 
customers can exploit that relationship and capture most of the potential rewards. Although U.S. accounting 
standards require that firms report major customer relationships (Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 14, 
superseded by FAS 131), little is known about their impact on firm operating performance. 
 
In this study, we examine the joint and several impacts of both major customer relationships and alliances 
on the operating performance of high-tech firms over the period 1988 to 2004. For this analysis, we first select all 
firms in designated high-tech industries (as defined in Francis and Schipper, 1999) and divide that sample into 
partnering and non-partnering firms based on whether the firm reports a major customer. We then further subdivide 
the partnering sub-sample based on whether those firms also announced alliances. We differentiate between research 
and marketing alliances and examine differences in the impact of alliances across high tech industries.  
 
We find evidence that major customer relationships improve operating performance, but gains often depend 
on the industry and nature of the partnership. We note firms that report major customer relationships generally 
perform better than firms that never make such disclosure. Similarly, firms that announce marketing alliances 
generally perform better than firms that do not announce alliances, although performance seems to erode over time. 
Firms that announce research alliances perform below industry counterparts on average, and that performance 
changes little during the alliances. Consistent with prior alliance research, we also find that alliance announcements 
are generally met with positive market response, although the status of the major customer relationship and the type 
of alliance (marketing versus research) both temper market reaction. This investigation adds to the body of 
knowledge about both strategic alliances and major customer relationships and provides insight into the 
circumstances in which such partnerships create value for the firm. With many firms facing increasing competitive 
pressures and uncertain operating environments, these results may provide managers with greater insight into which 
arrangements grant firms the greatest potential for value creation. 
 
INTERFIRM PARTNERSHIPS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Researchers broadly agree that firms enter partnerships to create and appropriate value. Arend and Amit 
(2005) note that firms engage in significant partnering activities based on their needs, opportunities, and incentives. 
For instance, firms seek to create value through partnerships by acquiring access to complementary resources that 
they do not possess (e.g., McConnell and Nantell, 1985; Alvarez and Barney, 2001) and to strengthen their 
competitive position (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Smaller and younger firms also seek partnerships to 
create legitimacy (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). A relationship with larger, established partners signals information to 
security analysts (Jensen, 2004) as well as other potential partners and third parties, enabling young firms to attract 
capital not otherwise available (Stuart et al., 1999). Firms appropriate value from partnerships when they capture 
rents from increased growth through access to products (Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Gomes-Casseres, 1997) and 
by reducing costs via increased operational efficiency (Harrigan, 1986; Dwyer and Oh, 1988). 
 
Despite the potential for value creation, many partnerships are not successful. Kale et al. (2002) report that 
over half of alliances fail, and Dyer et al. (2004) show that alliances typically create very little wealth for 
shareholders. A number of possible reasons exist for this lack of success. For instance, larger firms may capture 
disproportionate shares of any value created in the partnership (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Alvarez and Barney, 
2001) and partners may have different levels of investment and commitment to the relationship (Dwyer and Oh, 
1988). As Dekker (2004) and Reuer and Leiblein (2000) discuss, partnerships create control issues. For example, 
joint control challenges occur because of increased organizational complexity, and because each partner has an 
imperfect claim to the opportunities created. Thus, the partners face two problems: 1) creating value through a 
partnership, and 2) capturing that value for themselves.  
 
Major customer relationships and firm performance 
 
FAS 14’s stated purpose “to assist financial statement users in analyzing and understanding the enterprise's 
financial statements by permitting better assessment of the enterprise's past performance and future prospects” 
requires firms to disclose major customer relationships when “10 percent or more of the revenue of an enterprise is 
derived from sales to any single customer.” This standard was superseded by FAS 131, but the major customer 
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reporting requirement was retained. The underlying presumption is reliance on a major customer can affect future 
performance; thus disclosure is necessitated.  
 
     Although major customer relationships often take on the appearance of or become alliances, these 
relationships have received relatively little attention in academic literature, and the existing research focuses on the 
benefits to the customer firm. For example, Gosman et al. (2004) find that major retailing customer firms have 
significantly higher operating profitability, but they do not examine the impact of the buyer-supplier relationship on 
supplier performance. Ittner et al. (1999) find that the use of advanced supplier selection strategies enhances 
customer performance and operations when firms follow supplier partnership strategies. The supply chain 
management literature indicates that close ties between supplier and customer offer potential for sharing information 
and increasing operational efficiencies (e.g., Lambert, 2006).  
 
In summary, major customer relationships offer potential for value creation but do not necessarily imply 
suppliers will realize benefits. We therefore test the following null hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  High tech firms that enter a major customer relationship will not improve overall operating 
performance. 
 
Alliances and firm performance 
 
 The academic literature has paid more attention to alliances. In general, prior results have shown that such 
partnerships tend to generate positive market reactions, indicating a perceived association between alliance 
formation and positive long-term performance changes. For example, Piachaud and Muresan (2004) and Gleason et 
al. (2003) observe positive market reactions to the announcement of alliances. Marciukaiyte, et al. (2009), however, 
do not find that such returns persist over time. 
 
 Alliance purpose also seems to influence market reaction. Koh and Venkatraman (1991) find information 
technology joint ventures have a positive effect if they strengthen existing operations, but not if they develop new 
customers or enter new, unrelated product-market segments. Das et al. (1998) found technological alliances 
generated greater abnormal returns than marketing alliances, seemingly because marketing alliances indicate that the 
product market is mature and/or declining. Son et al. (2006) however, find that alliances can offer benefits in mature 
product life cycles even if total demand does not grow. Additionally, Chan et al. (1997) find alliances involving a 
transfer or pooling of technical knowledge created greater value. 
 
 Financial health has also been found to influence the magnitude of the market reaction. Mohanram and 
Nanda (1998) found firms with high levels of free cash flow before joint venture announcements experienced a 
negative market reaction. Similarly, Das et al. (1998) found abnormal returns to be negatively correlated with 
profitability and size.  
 
Bamford and Ernst (2002) argue managers must assess economic performance of partnerships over time. 
Despite the abundance of studies examining market expectations at alliance formation, relatively few studies have 
investigated whether those expectations were confirmed by long-term performance. For example, Chan et al. (1997) 
find little evidence alliances affect financial performance. Allen and Phillips (2000) find evidence of alliance 
performance benefits, but only in limited circumstances. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) were unable to show a 
direct relationship between strategic partnering and firm performance.  
 
In summary, relatively little is known about the longer-term performance consequences of alliances, 
although the type of alliance may affect performance. We differentiate between research alliances, where the 
purpose of the alliance is specifically research and development (R&D), and marketing alliances, where the purpose 
of the alliance is to market an existing product, examining the following null hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  High tech firms that enter formal alliances will not improve overall operating performance. 
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Hypothesis 2a:  High tech firms that enter formal research alliances will not improve overall operating 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2b:  High tech firms that enter formal marketing alliances will not improve overall operating 
performance. 
 
Alliances and major customer relationships combined 
 
 Although some factors that impact the benefit of alliances are known, less is known about major customer 
relationships, and essentially nothing is known about the combined impact of the two. This study seeks to fill this 
gap by examining a group of high-tech firms that entered both major customer relationships and alliances. The 
combined impact holds special importance for this group of firms, since many are small and struggling financially 
while trying to succeed in highly competitive industries that demand substantial capital funding.  
 
Further, as it appears governance structure (Lee and Cavusgil 2006), the complete alliance portfolio of a 
firm, relationship management (Beckett-Camarata, et al. 1998) and factors such as alliance experience contribute to 
positive partnership performance (Sarkar, Aulakh, and Madhok, 2009), the combined effect of alliances and major 
customer relationships may prove important. We therefore address the following null hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: High tech firms that participate in both major customer relationships and alliances do not improve 
overall operating performance. 
 
To test whether partnering arrangements individually or collectively enhance firm performance, we 
compare performance in partnering arrangements against two benchmarks: (1) Non-partnering firm performance 
within the same industries and (2) performance before those firms enter partnerships.  
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
 
The sample comprises high-tech firms during the period 1988 to 2004. We use SIC codes from Francis and 
Schipper (1999, Table 5) to determine high-tech industries. Using Compustat, we first identify all firms in those SIC 
categories. We eliminate firms with zero or missing values for total sales revenue. From that initial sample, we then 
further identify those firms that reported major customer relationships for any year during that period in accordance 
with FAS 14 (superseded by FAS 131). For each firm reporting a major customer relationship, we then identified 
whether that firm announced its participation in any alliance (e.g., joint venture, licensing agreement) during the 
period.  
 
We differentiate between research (purpose explicitly R&D) and marketing (purpose explicitly to market 
an existing product) alliances due to obvious differences in fundamental risk. In marketing alliances, viable products 
usually already exist and firms are joining forces to expand the market. In research alliances, especially in the 
pharmaceutical and biotech industry, a viable product may never exist. Furthermore, prior research finds greater 
returns to research alliances (e.g., Koh and Venkatraman, 1991).  
 
As Table 1 shows, pharmaceutical and biotech companies (SIC code 28) account for over 43% of the total 
high tech observations, 42% of the major customer relationships, 74% of the research alliances, and 58% of the 
marketing alliances. Computer and electronic manufacturers (SIC 35 and 36) collectively account for more than 
50% of the observations, 53% of the major customer relationships, and 26% of the research alliances, and 42% of 
the marketing alliances. Business services (SIC 87) account for 5% of the observations and 6% of the major 
customer relationships, but none of the alliances. 78% of the firms in these high-tech industries reported major 
customer relationships at some time during the period 1988 to 2004, with 11.4% reporting some type of alliance.  
 
To identify alliances, we searched the Wall Street Journal (on-line edition) for announcements of 
collaborative relationships. Since firms use a variety of terms to describe alliances, we used the broadest possible 
search, starting with only each firm’s name. We then reviewed all available articles to find announcements of 
alliances. We identified 288 announcements as summarized in Table 1. Of those announcements, 54% involved 
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research alliances, where the purpose of the alliance was either basic research or product development. 
Approximately 26% involved marketing alliances, where companies agreed to collaborate on the marketing of an 
existing product or one company licenses its products to another company. The remainder of the announcements 
involved acquisitions, which represent the closest possible relationship on the continuum of interfirm partnerships 
described by Chiesa and Manzini (1998). As Table 1 reports, most of the alliance announcements occurred during 
the 1990s, increasing each year until 1994 and then generally decreasing until 2003. The proportion of firms with 
major customer relationships generally increased from 70% in 1988 to 83% in 2004.  
 
ANALYSIS OF PARTNERSHIPS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Measuring firm performance 
 
Contractor and Lorange (1988, 2004) argue firms engage in partnerships to increase revenues or reduce 
costs, producing higher return on assets (ROA), ceteris paribus. We therefore focus on operating ROA (defined as 
operating income before depreciation, divided by total assets) as an overall measure of firm performance. ROA 
provides a direct measure of overall performance not confounded by differences in capital structure among firms.  
 
We also examine the impact of partnerships on R&D intensity, as R&D is both a source of potential 
competitive advantage and a major expense for high-tech firms. Managers in high tech firms seek to balance R&D 
investment against the negative impact on bottom-line earnings (Wilbon, 2002; Standard and Poor’s 2001). Since 
resource limitations may constrain firms’ ability to conduct research, firms may seek access to capital and other 
resources through partnerships since shared resources may allow firms to expand their R&D activities (e.g., 
McCutchen, Jr. and Swamidass, 2004). On the other hand, partnerships may reduce R&D intensity. Sales growth 
through a major customer relationship could reduce R&D and shared research efforts with alliance partners could 
spread R&D costs over multiple firms.  
 
Univariate analysis of firm performance before and during partnerships 
 
Operating ROA performance 
 
Table 2 summarizes operating ROA performance related to major customer relationships. As a benchmark, 
we adjust each firm’s reported operating ROA by subtracting the median operating ROA for all firms not engaging 
in major customer relationships in the same industry (3 digit SIC) and year. We also present results for firms that we 
term survivors. These are firms that continue in operation from the year they go public until at least 2004. Wilbon 
(2002) argues survival is the ultimate performance measure in high tech industries.  
 
For most of our sample, even before entering the partnership, firms that report major customer relationships 
have substantially higher median operating ROA than firms that never report such arrangements. After entering 
major customer relationships, median firm performance increases significantly for the pharmaceutical and biotech 
firms as well as the business services firms (p < 0.05, Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of populations). The 
performance increase is more pronounced for survivor firms, especially in the pharmaceutical and biotech industry 
(p < 0.001, Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of populations). Firms in the computer and electronics manufacturing 
industry, however, show little change in performance. Thus, null hypothesis 1 is not confirmed; firms improve 
performance during major customer relationships, although the results depend on the industry. 
 
Table 3 summarizes operating ROA performance related to research or marketing alliances. Again, the 
results vary by industry. Prior to announcing research alliances, operating ROA is substantially below the 
benchmark for firms in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries, but operating ROA increases significantly after 
the alliance announcements (p < 0.01, Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of populations). Thus, the results are mixed; 
null hypotheses 2 and 2a are not confirmed for firms in the pharmaceutical and biotech industry as they do improve 
operating performance following research alliances. Firms in the computer and electronics manufacturing industry 
see no similar improvement.  
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics 
Major Customer Relationship and Alliance Partnership Counts 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
and Biotech 
Computer, 
Electronics and 
Electrical 
Manufacturing 
Business 
Services Total 
     
All Available Firm-Year Observationsa 5,879 6,955 707 13,541 
     
Report Major Customersb 4,398 5,547 614 10,559 
Percent of All Available 74.80% 79.76% 86.80% 78.00% 
     
Report Research Alliancec 518 184 0 702 
Percent of Firms Reporting Major Customers 11.80% 3.32% 0.00% 6.60% 
     
Report Marketing Alliancec 291 212 0 503 
Percent of Firms Reporting Major Customers 6.60% 3.82% 0.00% 4.80% 
  
Count and value of announced alliances 
Type of Alliance Number of announcements 
Value of 
announcements 
($ mm) 
Value of acquisitions 
($ mm) 
Research alliance 155 $4,719.2 $0.0 
Marketing alliance 76 $2,328.1 $0.0 
Acquisition 57 $74,418.3 $73,758.3 
Total 288 $81,465.6 $73,758.3 
 
Distribution of partnerships by year 
Year 
Number of 
alliance 
announcements 
Value of 
announcements 
($ mm) 
Value of 
acquisitions 
($mm) 
Total 
Number 
of Firms 
Number of Firms 
w/Major 
Customer 
Relationship 
Proportion of 
Firms 
w/Major 
Customer 
1988 4 $49.0 $0.0 566 398 70% 
1989 9 $0.0 $0.0 563 409 73% 
1990 14 $192.8 $0.0 586 439 75% 
1991 18 $1,696.5 $520.0 626 471 75% 
1992 24 $840.0 $810.0 687 516 75% 
1993 28 $787.4 $450.0 740 551 74% 
1994 37 $830.9 $539.6 778 588 76% 
1995 30 $9,972.6 $9,603.6 885 668 75% 
1996 31 $7,534.8 $6,800.5 934 708 76% 
1997 19 $2,610.5 $1,886.0 933 717 77% 
1998 18 $1,747.5 $1,053.0 992 780 79% 
1999 19 $35,308.5 $34,856.0 979 781 80% 
2000 17 $2,035.5 $1,282.5 943 765 81% 
2001 8 $14,375.0 $13,290.0 889 739 83% 
2002 5 $2,145.1 $2,037.1 858 719 84% 
2003 7 $1,339.5 $630.0 837 690 82% 
2004 0 $0.0 $0.0 745 620 83% 
Total 
sample 288 $81,465.6 $73,758.3 13,541 10,559 78% 
a Firms with sales data; b Firms that reported a major customer relationship at any time during the sample period; c Firms that 
announced alliance during the sample period. 
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Table 2 
Median Operating Return on Assets (ROA)a around the First Year of Major Customer Relationships (MCR) 
(with numbers of observations for each industry and year) 
 All Available Observations Observations for Survivorb Firms 
 Industry  Industry  
Year 
Relative to 
Start (0) of 
MCR 
Pharma. 
and 
Biotech 
(SIC 28) 
Computer, 
Electronics 
and Electrical 
Mfg. 
(SICs 35, 36) 
Business 
Services 
(SIC 87) Total 
Pharma. 
and 
Biotech 
(SIC 28) 
Computer, 
Electronics 
and Electrical 
Mfg. 
(SICs 35, 36) 
Business 
Services 
(SIC 87) Total 
-3 0.123 0.012 0.363 0.051 0.160 0.020 0.363 0.065 
 275 295 30 600 181 191 22 394 
-2 0.138 0.009 0.413 0.056 0.186 0.026 0.429 0.075 
 299 331 36 666 195 207 26 428 
-1 0.131 0.004 0.397 0.044 0.181 0.025 0.440 0.071 
 326 363 43 732 213 222 28 63 
0 0.108 0.019 0.424 0.057 0.177 0.036 0.458 0.105 
 427 480 64 971 257 262 37 556 
1 0.136 0.022 0.475 0.074 0.199 0.047 0.494 0.110 
 388 445 60 893 240 259 37 536 
2 0.181 -0.011 0.355 0.055 0.233 -0.003 0.402 0.082 
 343 410 57 810 225 254 37 516 
3 0.245 0.001 0.469 0.067 0.286 0.008 0.582 0.089 
 300 360 49 709 202 241 34 477 
Total 0.151 0.008 0.408 0.057 0.205 0.025 0.449 0.085 
 2,358 2,684 339 5,381 1,513 1,636 221 3,370 
a Operating ROA (operating income divided by total assets) values adjusted by subtracting the median value for those firms that 
did not engage in major customer relationships or announce alliances within the same industry and year. b Firms with financial 
data on Compustat for every year since they first reported publicly available data.  
 
Table 3 
Median Operating Return on Assets (ROA)a around the First Year of Announced Alliances 
(with numbers of observations for each industry and year) 
 Research Alliances Marketing Alliances 
 Industry  Industry  
Year 
Relative to 
Start (0) of 
Alliance 
Pharma. 
and Biotech 
(SIC 28) 
Computer, 
Electronics and 
Electrical Mfg. 
(SICs 35, 36) Total 
Pharma. 
and Biotech 
(SIC 28) 
Computer, 
Electronics and 
Electrical Mfg. 
(SICs 35, 36) Total 
-3 -0.128 0.074 -0.007 0.151 0.048 0.061 
 28 9 37 11 12 23 
-2 -0.059 -0.044 -0.051 0.085 0.047 0.053 
 33 15 48 15 15 30 
-1 -0.114 0.044 -0.036 0.111 0.067 0.074 
 40 15 55 20 17 37 
0 -0.016 -0.036 -0.016 0.111 -0.003 0.054 
 51 17 68 24 17 41 
1 -0.011 0.001 -0.005 0.169 -0.004 0.049 
 49 17 66 24 18 42 
2 -0.025 -0.023 -0.025 0.130 0.011 0.026 
 44 16 60 22 16 38 
3 0.123 0.001 0.033 0.167 -0.061 0.052 
 39 13 52 21 16 37 
Total -0.023 -0.008 -0.017 0.113 0.006 0.053 
 284 102 386 137 111 248 
a Operating ROA (operating income divided by total assets) values adjusted by subtracting the median value for those firms that 
did not engage in major customer relationships or announce alliances within the same industry and year. 
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Both before and after marketing alliance announcements, firms in the pharmaceutical and biotech industry 
substantially outperform the benchmark, but the increase in performance is not significant. Again, performance does 
not significantly improve for firms in the computer and electronics manufacturing industry. Thus, the null 
hypothesis (2b) is confirmed for both industries.  
 
Research and Development intensity (R&D/Sales Ratio) performance 
 
Table 4 summarizes R&D intensity around the start of major customer relationships. The results are again 
mixed with patterns similar to those shown in Table 2. Pharmaceutical and biotech and business service firms have 
substantially lower R&D intensity than the benchmark both before and after major customer relationships. For these 
firms, R&D intensity decreases significantly after entering major customer relationships (p < 0.01, Kruskal-Wallis 
test of equality of populations), and the results are more pronounced for survivor firms (p < 0.0001, Kruskal-Wallis 
test). These results cause rejection of null hypothesis 1. For firms in the computer and electronics manufacturing 
industry, however, R&D intensity is similar to the benchmark firms and does not significantly change after starting 
the customer relationship.  
 
Table 4 
Median R&D Intensitya around the First Year of Reported Major Customer Relationships (MCR) 
(with numbers of observations for each industry and year) 
 All Available Observations Observations for Survivor Firms 
 Industry  Industry  
Year Relative 
to Start (0) of 
MCR 
Pharm
a. and 
Biotech 
Computer, 
Electronics 
Mfg. 
Business 
Services Total 
Pharma. 
and 
Biotech 
Computer, 
Electronics 
Mfg. 
Business 
Services Total 
-3 -0.599 -0.002 -5.149 -0.033 -0.671 0.000 -5.175 -0.031 
 275 295 30 600 181 191 22 394 
-2 -0.658 -0.008 -3.043 -0.043 -0.734 -0.010 -3.045 -0.047 
 299 331 36 666 195 207 26 428 
-1 -0.738 -0.013 -1.737 -0.053 -0.875 -0.016 -2.365 -0.068 
 326 363 43 732 213 222 28 463 
0 -0.878 -0.013 -4.499 -0.052 -1.151 -0.028 -6.831 -0.085 
 427 480 64 971 257 262 37 556 
1 -1.197 -0.005 -6.407 -0.056 -1.433 -0.014 -6.868 -0.081 
 388 445 60 893 240 259 37 536 
2 -1.443 0.008 -6.593 -0.057 -1.615 0.001 -6.811 -0.071 
 343 410 57 810 225 254 37 516 
3 -1.752 0.004 -6.864 -0.071 -1.989 0.003 -6.913 -0.088 
 300 360 49 709 202 241 34 477 
Total -0.878 -0.003 -5.017 -0.052 -0.985 -0.010 -5.956 -0.068 
 2,358 2,684 339 5,381 1,513 1,636 221 3,370 
a R&D intensity is R&D expense scaled by sales and adjusted by subtracting the median R&D intensity for non-supplier, non-
alliance firms in the same 3 digit SIC and year. 
 
Table 5 summarizes R&D intensity around the alliance. For all firms entering research alliances, R&D 
intensity is substantially higher than the benchmark both before and after the alliance, and the overall R&D intensity 
does not significantly decrease after the research alliance announcements. For pharmaceutical and biotech firms, 
high R&D intensity continues even after announcing research alliances. These results are consistent with 
Datamonitor’s (2007) industry analysis which states that research-intensive biotech firms often seek to speed up an 
extended development process and not necessarily to reduce costs.  
 
For firms entering marketing alliances, R&D intensity is generally below the benchmark, although the 
difference is not substantial for computer and electronics manufacturing firms. R&D intensity decreases 
significantly after marketing alliance announcements for pharmaceutical and biotech firms (p < 0.01, Kruskal-Wallis 
test), but does not change for computer and electronics manufacturing firms. Thus, there is some evidence firms 
entering marketing alliances do so to reduce R&D costs. Again, the results for null hypotheses 2, 2a, and 2b are 
mixed. 
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Table 5 
Median R&D Intensitya around the First Year of Announced Research and Marketing Alliances 
(with numbers of observations for each industry and year) 
 Research Alliances Marketing Alliances 
 Industry  Industry  
Year 
Relative to 
Start (0) of 
Alliance 
Pharma. and 
Biotech 
Computer, 
Electronics 
Mfg. Total 
Pharma. and 
Biotech 
Computer, 
Electronics 
Mfg. Total 
-3 1.371 0.010 0.576 -0.056 -0.011 -0.024 
 28 9 37 11 12 23 
-2 1.113 0.068 0.278 0.259 0.007 0.010 
 33 15 48 15 15 30 
-1 0.632 0.066 0.258 -0.113 -0.025 -0.035 
 40 15 55 20 17 37 
0 0.621 0.085 0.254 -0.155 -0.017 -0.040 
 51 17 68 24 17 41 
1 1.414 0.077 0.274 -0.228 -0.010 -0.032 
 49 17 66 24 18 42 
2 1.055 0.089 0.283 -0.317 0.006 -0.009 
 44 16 60 22 16 38 
3 0.137 0.039 0.072 -0.405 -0.007 -0.045 
 39 13 52 21 16 37 
Total 0.843 0.073 0.259 -0.138 -0.007 -0.026 
 284 102 386 137 111 248 
a R&D intensity is R&D expense scaled by sales and adjusted by subtracting the median R&D intensity for non-supplier, non-
alliance firms in the same 3 digit SIC and year. 
 
Multivariate analysis of the effect of partnerships on firm performance 
 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) present a model of partnership performance where regional and 
industry factors influence company structure, which then influences firms propensity to enter partnerships, and the 
propensity to enter partnerships, firm structure, and regional and industry factors ultimately influence economic 
performance. Thus, we control for firms’ propensity to engage in major customer relationships, research, or 
marketing alliances by first computing propensity scores and then including those scores as controls in subsequent 
regressions (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Wooldridge 2003).  
 
To predict the propensity of firms to enter partnerships based on firm and industry characteristics, we 
compute firm-specific propensity scores using the logit models shown in Table 6 and as follows: 
 
Pr(Partnering) = b0 + b1 Adjusted_Operating_ROS  
+ b2 Median_Industry_Operating ROS + b3 Size  
+ b4 Business_Segment_Count + b5 Industry_Concentration  
+ b6 Sales_Growth + b7 Firm_Age + b8 Survivor + e.  (1) 
 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate partnering firms perform better than non-partnering firms even before 
initiating partnerships. We therefore include two broad firm performance measures: 1) Adjusted_Operating_ROS 
(operating income divided by sales; adjusted by median industry operating ROS for non-supplier, non-alliance 
firms) and 2) Sales_Growth (sales divided by prior year sales).  
 
Larger, older, more complex high tech firms may be more likely to engage in partnering, since they are 
more likely to have proven products or established reputations. Prior research also indicates younger firms may 
benefit differently than larger firms from partnerships (e.g., Stuart et al. 1999, Haussler, 2006). As a result, we also 
include three measures of firm size and complexity: 1) Size, defined as the log of sales, 2) Firm_Age, defined as the 
number of years since the first year financial data was available on Compustat, and 3) Business_Segment_Count, the 
number of different business segments identified in the Compustat Segments file.  
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Since prior research suggests industry characteristics affect the propensity to engage in partnerships (e.g., 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994), we specifically include two industry measures: 1) 
Median_Industry_Operating_ROS (the median value for the 3 digit SIC for each year for those firms that do not 
report interfirm partnerships) and 2) Industry_Concentration (ratio of the sales of the largest four firms in the 3 digit 
SIC to total sales for that industry each year). We also include dummy variables to control for general industry 
characteristics. Finally, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether or not that firm was a survivor as 
discussed earlier. Column 1 in Table 6 shows industry characteristics significantly influence the propensity for firms 
to engage in major customer relationships. Somewhat surprisingly, older firms are less likely to engage in major 
customer relationships after controlling for other firm and industry characteristics. Column 2 in Table 6 shows 
industry performance is significantly positively related to the propensity to engage in research alliances. Research 
alliance companies tend to be younger firms with fewer business segments. Column 3 in Table 6 shows industry 
characteristics also influence the propensity to engage in marketing alliances. Marketing alliance firms tend to be 
larger and faster growing, but younger than other firms in the sample. Survivor firms are significantly more likely to 
engage in all three interfirm partnerships. 
 
Table 6 
Logit Models Used to Determine Propensity Scores for Period between 1988 and First Reported Major Customer 
Relationship or Announced Alliance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Supplierit res_coit mkt_coit 
Adjusted_Operating_ROSit 0.011 -0.010 -0.028 
 (3.94)*** (1.02) (2.20)** 
Median_Industry_Operating_ROSit 0.674 1.091 1.283 
 (20.04)*** (4.36)*** (3.07)*** 
Sizeit -0.004 0.101 0.234 
 (0.26) (1.71)* (3.22)*** 
Business_Segment_Countit 0.035 -1.417 -1.383 
 (0.40) (2.46)** (2.01)** 
Industry_Concentrationit 2.185 3.880 17.089 
 (3.96)*** (1.38) (3.58)*** 
Sales_Growthit -0.023 -0.070 0.154 
 (1.12) (0.91) (2.02)** 
Firm_Ageit -0.010 -0.097 -0.038 
 (2.45)** (4.26)*** (1.73)* 
Survivori 2.302 1.379 0.803 
 (33.14)*** (5.59)*** (2.66)*** 
Constant -0.368 -4.336 -10.486 
 (1.81)* (4.08)*** (5.83)*** 
Observations 6198 5930 5765 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.18 0.13 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Industry (3 digit SIC) controls included but not reported  
supplier = 1 if firm reported major customer relationship at any time during 1988 to 2004, 0 otherwise; res_co = 1 if firm 
announced research alliance at any time during 1988 to 2004, 0 otherwise; mkt_co = 1 if firm announced marketing alliance at 
any time during 1988 to 2004, 0 otherwise; Adjusted_Operating_ROS = firm operating ROS minus industry median operating 
ROS (Compustat item 13 divided by item 12); Median_Industry_Operating _ROS = industry median operating ROS (Compustat 
item 13 divided by item 12); Size = natural log of sales (Compustat item 12); Business_Segment_Count = natural log of the 
number of segments from Compustat Segments; Industry_Concentration = four firm concentration ratio for 3 digit SIC each 
year; Sales_Growth = sales in year t divided by sales in t-1; Firm_Age = number of years since first Compustat entry; Survivor = 
1 if firm data available on Compustat for all years between first public year and 2005; i indicates firm, t indicates year. 
 
Operating ROA performance 
 
Table 7 examines the impact of partnerships on operating ROA. We begin with the premise that each firm’s 
performance is substantially determined by its prior performance and size. We then examine whether performance 
relative to previous performance is higher during the years that firms report major customer relationships or within 3 
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years after they announce alliances. We control for firm size, since Gomes-Casseres (1997) and Alvarez and Barney 
(2001) document a relationship between firm size and partnership benefits. We control for selection bias with the 
propensity scores from the models shown in Table 6. We test the following model:  
 
Op_ROAit = b0 + b1 Op_ROAit-1 + b2 Sizeit + b3 In_CRit + b4 In_Researchit  
 + b5 In_Marketing_Allianceit + b6 Pr(Supplier)i + b7 Pr(Research)i  
 + b8 Pr (Marketing)i + eit (2a) 
 
We also consider interaction terms to examine the joint effect of both major customer relationships and alliances:  
 
Op_ROAit = b0 + b1 Op_ROAit-1 + b2 Sizeit + b3 In_CRit + b4 In_Researchit 
 + b5 In_Marketingit + b6 In_CRit x In_Researchit + b7 In_CRit x In_Marketingit 
 + b8 Pr(Supplier)i + b9 Pr(Research)i + b10 Pr(Marketing)i + eit (2b) 
 
Where: Op ROA = operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) divided by total assets (Compustat 
item 6) and adjusted by subtracting the annual industry median operating ROA for non-supplier, non-alliance 
firms; Size = natural log of sales (Compustat item 12); In_CR= 1 if firm reports major customer relationship that 
year, 0 otherwise; In_Research = 1 if firm announced research alliance within the previous three years, 0 otherwise; 
In_Marketing = 1 if firm announced marketing alliance within the previous three years, 0 otherwise; Pr(Supplier) = 
propensity to enter major customer relationship from Table 6, column 1; Pr(Research) = propensity to announce 
research alliance from Table 6, column 2; Pr(Marketing) = propensity to announce marketing alliance from Table 
6, column 3; In_CR x In_Research = interaction term measuring the joint impact of both a major customer 
relationship and research alliance; In_CR x In_Marketing = interaction term measuring the joint impact of both a 
major customer relationship and marketing alliance. 
 
Table 7 presents the regression estimates of Equations 2a and 2b. As expected, current performance is 
related to prior performance and size. Of interest, performance is significantly higher during major customer 
relationships, but lower during both research and marketing alliances. We note a strong relation between the supplier 
propensity score and operating performance, indicating firms that enter customer relationships already perform 
better on average than other firms in the sample. Performance further improves during the partnership. Univariate 
results in Table 3 suggest both research and marketing firms improved performance after the alliance announcement. 
The multivariate results in Table 7 suggest otherwise. Firms in the pharmaceutical and biotech industry perform 
worse during research alliances and firms in the computer and electronics manufacturing industry perform worse 
during marketing alliances. Overall, these results contravene null hypothesis 1 but confirm hypotheses 2, 2a, and 2b.  
 
In Column 2 of Table 7, in_cr x in_marketing is significantly positive, suggesting some synergy between 
major customer relationships and marketing alliances. Overall, though, there is little to suggest substantial synergies, 
generally confirming null hypothesis 3.  
R&D Intensity performance 
 
To better understand the impact of partnerships, we also examine R&D intensity, since R&D is so vital for 
many high tech firms. In Table 8, we again use Equations 2a and 2b but substitute adjusted R&D intensity measures 
for the operating ROA performance measures. We first note firms with greater propensity to enter major customer 
relationships have significantly lower R&D intensity and R&D intensity decreases while firms are in those 
relationships. With results in Table 7, these suggest firms leverage their customer relationships to become more 
efficient.  
 
R&D intensity does not increase in research alliances after controlling for size and the propensity to enter 
such alliances. Similarly, R&D intensity does not increase during marketing alliances and those firms have 
substantially lower levels of R&D intensity prior to the alliance. In Column 2, the interaction terms indicate firms in 
both major customer relationships and research alliances also increase R&D intensity, suggesting these firms’ major 
customers may use this relationship to outsource R&D. 
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Table 7 
Regression Tests of Effect of Major Customer Relationships and Alliances on Operating Return on Assets (ROA)a 
 (1) (2) 
Pharmaceuticals 
and Biotech 
Computer, 
Electronics 
Manufacturing 
 op_roait op_roait op_roait op_roait 
     
Op_ROAit-1 0.551 0.551 0.509 0.585 
 (34.16)*** (34.14)*** (21.78)*** (27.50)*** 
Sizeit 0.048 0.048 0.056 0.040 
 (25.58)*** (25.57)*** (20.06)*** (15.95)*** 
In_CRit 0.021 0.019 0.034 0.020 
 (2.50)** (2.24)** (2.60)*** (1.91)* 
In_Researchit -0.029 -0.033 -0.034 -0.019 
 (2.30)** (1.80)* (2.27)** (0.97) 
In_Marketingit -0.041 -0.063 -0.027 -0.062 
 (2.39)** (2.46)** (1.20) (2.65)*** 
In_CRit x In_Researchit  0.012   
  (0.51)   
In_CRit x In_Marketingit  0.056   
  (1.76)*   
Pr(Supplier)i 0.032 0.033 0.058 0.110 
 (2.22)** (2.28)** (2.09)** (5.97)*** 
Pr(Research)i -0.371 -0.370 -0.203 -0.283 
 (1.63) (1.62) (0.67) (0.81) 
Pr(Marketing)i 0.229 0.232 1.761 -0.499 
 (0.60) (0.61) (2.93)*** (1.07) 
Constant -0.119 -0.119 -0.174 -0.282 
 (10.54)*** (10.55)*** (9.90)*** (14.69)*** 
     
Observations 10571 10571 5014 5557 
Adj R2 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.55 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Industry and Year controls included but not reported 
Op_ROA = operating return on assets (Compustat item 13 divided by item 6); Size = natural log of sales (Compustat item 12); 
In_CR = 1 if firm in major customer relationship, 0 otherwise; in_research = 1 if firm within 3 years after announcement of 
research alliance, 0 otherwise; In_Marketing = 1 if firm within 3 years after announcement of marketing alliance, 0 otherwise 
In_CR x In_Research = interaction term; In_CR x In_Marketing = interaction term; Pr(Supplier) = propensity for supplier 
determined from Model 1 in Table 6; Pr(Research) = propensity for company to enter research alliance from model 2 in Table 6; 
Pr(Marketing) = propensity for company to enter marketing alliance from Model 3 in Table 6; i indicates firm, t indicates year. 
 
The results for pharmaceutical and biotech industry firms are generally similar to the overall results in 
column (1) of Table 8, although R&D intensity does increase during research alliances. For computer and 
electronics manufacturing firms, R&D intensity increases in both types of alliances. Again, there is little evidence 
alliances support cost reduction efforts.  
 
Market reactions to alliance announcements 
 
 Finally, we test whether the market reaction to the alliance announcements in our sample is consistent with 
prior research that documents a positive market reaction to alliances. Of note, no previous study has tested whether a 
major customer relationship or other operational constraint affects the market’s reaction to an alliance 
announcement. 
 
We test the market reaction to the announcement of the alliances and acquisitions using event study 
methodology. Following Allen and Phillips (2000), we employed a 175-day estimation period from 200 days to 25 
prior to the announcement date. Since the alliance announcements are often made several days after the actual 
agreement, it is possible the market reacts prior to the publication in the Wall Street Journal. Thus, we report CARs 
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and average abnormal returns over a 21-day (-10, +10) event window as well as over a shorter 4-day window (-2, 
+1). We estimate abnormal returns as the ordinary least squares residuals from a single-factor market model using a 
value-weighted market portfolio. The reported significance tests are based on the standardized residuals method 
(Patell, 1976) for the CARs and standardized cross-sectional method (Boehmer et al., 1991) for the average 
abnormal returns.  
 
Table 9 presents results from the event study using the approximately 80 percent (229 of 288) 
announcements with available security return data over the estimation window. The CARs for the total sample are 6 
percent, significant at the 1 percent level, for both event windows. The abnormal returns are 0.3 percent for the 
longer window and 1.4 percent for the shorter window, again both significant at the 1 percent level. Approximately 
64 percent of the CARs are positive in the shorter window, which is also significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
Table 8 
Regression Tests of Effect of Major Customer Relationships and Alliances on R&D Intensity (R&D/Sales)a 
 (1) (2) 
Pharmaceuticals 
and Biotech 
Computer, 
Electronics 
Manufacturing 
 rd_slsit rd_slsit rd_slsit rd_slsit 
     
rd_slsit-1 0.480 0.480 0.441 0.477 
 (20.77)*** (20.76)*** (17.98)*** (6.83)*** 
sizeit -0.681 -0.681 -1.035 -0.231 
 (18.03)*** (18.03)*** (17.49)*** (5.55)*** 
in_crit -0.469 -0.526 -0.593 -0.256 
 (3.38)*** (3.75)*** (2.22)** (3.02)*** 
in_researchit 0.513 -0.264 0.713 0.188 
 (1.49) (0.78) (1.66)* (3.35)*** 
in_marketingit 0.225 0.375 0.453 0.255 
 (1.18) (1.55) (1.42) (3.69)*** 
in_crit x in_researchit  1.649   
  (2.40)**   
in_crit x in_marketingit  -0.116   
  (0.33)   
Pr(supplier) i -1.001 -0.978 -3.126 -0.259 
 (4.55)*** (4.46)*** (5.78)*** (1.56) 
Pr(res_co) i 10.490 10.773 26.043 -7.279 
 (2.85)*** (2.93)*** (4.11)*** (3.67)*** 
Pr(mkt_co) i 19.979 19.784 10.745 25.569 
 (2.67)*** (2.64)*** (0.81) (4.07)*** 
Constant 3.077 3.077 5.077 1.205 
 (13.17)*** (13.17)*** (13.47)*** (4.83)*** 
     
Observations 10571 10571 5014 5557 
Adj R2 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.36 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Industry and Year controls included but not reported 
rd_sls = R&D expense (Compustat item 46) divided by sales (item 12) and adjusted by subtracting median rd_sls value for non-
supplier, non-alliance firms for the same industry (3 digit SIC) and year; size = natural log of sales (Compustat item 12); in_cr = 
1 if firm in major customer relationship, 0 otherwise; in_research = 1 if firm within 3 years after announcement of research 
alliance, 0 otherwise; in_marketing = 1 if firm within 3 years after announcement of marketing alliance, 0 otherwise; in_cr x 
in_research = interaction term; in_cr x in_marketing = interaction term; Pr(supplier) = propensity for supplier determined from 
Model 1; Pr(res_co) = propensity for company to enter research alliance; Pr(mkt_co) = propensity for company to enter 
marketing alliance; i indicates firm, t indicates year. 
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Table 9 
Cumulative and Mean Abnormal Returns by Industry, Major Customer Relationship Status, and Alliance Type 
   CAR Event Windows Mean AR Event Windows  
 N (-10, + 10) (-2, 1) (-10, + 10) (-2, 1) +/- 
       
Total sample 229 0.06(4.64)*** 0.06(3.98)*** 0.003(2.59)*** 0.014(2.55)*** 147/82*** 
 
By Industry classification 
Pharmaceuticals/Biotech (SIC 28) 164 0.07(4.37)*** 0.06(2.01)** 0.003(2.30)** 0.011(1.60)* 107/57*** 
Computer equipment and Electronics Manufacturing (SIC 35 and 36) 65 0.06(2.37)*** 0.08(3.96)*** 0.004(1.02) 0.018(1.64) 40/25** 
      
By major customer relationship      
Pre-major customer relation 116 0.05(3.53)*** 0.05(3.57)*** 0.002(1.87)** 0.013(2.10)** 75/41*** 
During major customer relation 92 0.07(2.68)*** 0.09(2.54)*** 0.004(1.57)* 0.016(1.64)* 58/34*** 
       
By type of alliance/acquisition       
Research alliance 122 0.05(3.03)*** 0.04(1.74)** 0.002(1.77)** 0.008(1.13) 71/51** 
Marketing alliance 62 0.03(1.78)** 0.03(2.96)*** 0.001(1.16) 0.014(1.77)** 43/19*** 
Acquisition 45 0.13(3.37)*** 0.16(2.62)*** 0.022(1.39)* 0.014(1.63)* 33/12*** 
       
By type of alliance and customer status       
Research alliance pre-major customer relationship 74 0.08(3.63)*** 0.06(2.49)*** 0.004(1.61)* 0.014(1.44)* 46/28** 
Research alliance during major customer relationship 40 0.01(0.18) 0.04(0.51) 0.000(0.16) 0.008(0.35) 22/18 
Marketing alliance pre-major customer relationship 40 0.00(0.95) 0.03(2.26)** 0.000(0.69) 0.009(1.40)* 28/12** 
Marketing alliance during major customer relationship 14 0.10(1.61)* 0.07(2.37)** 0.005(0.68) 0.025(1.00) 8/6 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Sample consists of 104 firms in the sample that participated in 229 alliance or acquisition announcements.  
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with CRSP value-weighted returns estimated over the period from 200 days to 25 days prior to the announcement.  
z statistics for CAR in parentheses are calculated from the standardized abnormal returns following Patell (1976); t-statistics for mean AR in parentheses are based on the 
standardized cross-sectional method. The number of positive and negative CAR values during the (-2, 1) window are presented in the last column with significance determined by 
the generalized sign test. 
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We find abnormal returns are generally similar for the two industries and before and during major customer 
relationships. Since there are relatively few alliance announcements after firms end major customer relationships, 
we do not report results for that situation. Comparing the market reaction to research versus marketing alliances, the 
abnormal returns are generally higher for research alliances, although CARs for both are significantly greater than 
zero. For comparison, the market clearly reacts more strongly to acquisition announcements. The acquisition CARs 
are 13 percent for the longer window and 16 percent for the shorter window, both significant at the 1 percent level 
and substantially higher than the corresponding CARs for the alliances.  
 
The market reacts more strongly to research alliance announcements before major customer relationships 
and to marketing alliance announcements during major customer relationships. Firms generally have similar 
strategic motives for both major customer relationships and marketing alliances. Firms enter these ventures to 
expand their market and grow revenues. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the market to react more strongly to 
marketing alliances during major customer relationships. The strategic motives for research alliances and major 
customer relationships can differ. Research alliances focus on innovation and new product development, and not the 
sales of existing products. Thus, it is also reasonable the market reacts more strongly to research alliances before 
major customer relationships. 
 
In summary, our event study results are consistent with prior research. The market reacts positively to 
alliance announcements. Our operating performance results suggest, however, that the market may be 
overestimating future performance.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this paper, we examine how interfirm partnerships impact firm performance. With a global economy, 
rapid product cycles, capital constraints and advances in technology, firms seldom possess all the capability 
necessary to maintain and grow market share. Consequently, firms often rely on a variety of partnerships. Theory 
suggests firms enter such relationships to improve performance through access to new products, new markets, new 
capabilities, and more resources. Yet, relatively little is known about the long-term impact of collaborative 
arrangements such as alliances and major customer relationships.  
 
Our study provides evidence that benefits of interfirm partnerships are industry and type specific. The 
generally positive market reaction to alliance announcements seems overly optimistic. Only firms in major customer 
relationships consistently demonstrate significant increases in performance, and those companies already 
outperformed peers before entering those relationships. Our results provide evidence in support of managers’ 
opinions that collaborative ventures do not always achieve their stated objectives PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004).  
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